New CEOs

Smoke signals

A new CEO should spend their first year teaching everybody to smell smoke, rather than ignoring it or starting a fire

Reinvantage InsightOctober 28, 20265 min read
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Nokia was selling more than a third of all mobile phones and almost half of all smartphones in 2006, shipping around 348 million mobile devices worldwide that year, with 105.5 million units selling in the fourth quarter alone. It was the very definition of a stable, even thriving company, but what happened next (very quickly) has similarly become the very definition of a company failing to recognise that what was making it successful was about to make it all but irrelevant.

When Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo took charge of the Finnish firm in June 2006 (and Kallasvuo was a company man who had joined Nokia way back in 1982), it was far too easy to conclude that precious little needed changing, and Kallasvuo therefore changed very little. When Apple launched the iPhone the following year, Kallasvuo reportedly dismissed it, predicting that Apple would struggle to turn "mindshare into market share" in the phone category, later doubling down to say that the iPhone would, “not in any way necessitate us changing our thinking”. By the time he left the company in 2010, its share of the smartphone market had slipped to 31 per cent and its share price had lost almost two-thirds of its value.

His replacement, Stephen Elop (a Canadian brought in from Microsoft), went the other way entirely. In February 2011 he sent staff a memo, which was quickly leaked, which told them that they were standing on a burning platform. He ditched Nokia’s own smartphone software for Microsoft’s, and in September 2013 sold the handset business (the bit that everybody actually thought of as Nokia) to Microsoft for 5.44 billion euros. To stretch a metaphor as far as it will go, if one Nokia boss ignored the smoke, the next set fire to the building. Neither of them, as it turned out, managed to save the company.

A third way

There are rather a lot of new bosses about at the moment who are currently tasked with the job of deciding which of the two approaches they will take. Challenger, Gray & Christmas, an outplacement firm, counted 446 departures of chief executives from listed American companies in 2025, the highest number since it began counting back in 2002. And when PwC, a consultancy, surveyed bosses around the world at the start of last year, 42 per cent of them said that their company would not survive another decade if it simply carried on doing what it was already doing. What’s strange is that most of them, presumably, are not running firms currently in any sort of crisis.

Crisis or not, the overwhelming temptation for any newcomer is to reach for the matches. Ron Johnson, who had built Apple’s chain of shops from nothing, arrived at J.C. Penney, an American department-store chain, in November 2011 and almost immediately did away with the coupons and the endless sales events that its customers (notoriously thrifty, but loyal to a fault) had come to expect. When it was suggested that he might first try the idea out in a few stores to see if it worked, he reportedly replied that “we didn’t test at Apple”. The company lost 4.3 billion US dollars in sales in 2012, and Johnson left in April 2013, just 17 months into the job.

At Disney, Bob Chapek was even shorter on patience when he took over from Bob Iger in February 2020. He quickly announced a major restructuring of Disney's media and entertainment division to separate content creation from content distribution, taking budgeting decisions away from the people who actually made the films and programmes (which went down, as anyone who has ever met a film producer could have told him, rather badly). Disney’s board ousted him in November 2022, and brought back Iger.

The move most closely associated with outperformance is a redesign of how an organisation actually works.

In 2016, Michael Birshan and two colleagues at McKinsey, another consultancy, looked at the first two years in office of almost 600 bosses of big firms and found that at companies which had been doing well before the new CEO arrived, major upheaval such as replacing more than half of the top team tended to destroy existing value rather than create new value.

If this suggests that this makes an excellent case for doing nothing, then you’ve reached the wrong conclusion, and Kallasvuo is in many ways the textbook reason why. Michael Watkins, author of a much-quoted book on a leader’s first 90 days, says that a boss inheriting a successful firm must first invest in learning its culture and politics, and win enough trust to be allowed to make tough choices later on. Far too many new CEOs however only ever take on board the first half of that advice (they learn the culture, admire the culture, and then become the culture, and those tough choices never get made). That same McKinsey study found that the move most closely associated with outperformance at already healthy firms was in fact a redesign of how the organisation actually worked, which it linked to annual returns 1.9 percentage points above those of industry peers.

Disappointingly uneventful

That’s what Piyush Gupta, who took over DBS in 2009, did (or at least did something close to it). The Singaporean bank he inherited was a far from failing enterprise (it was already one of the biggest lenders in South-East Asia), but it had earned itself the nickname ‘Damn, Bloody, Slow’. Gupta began with a slightly odd-sounding mission (to make banking, of all things, joyful). Staff were put together with people from start-ups for hackathons, and while the first of these were stocked with twenty-somethings, by the third he was deliberately adding staff in their 40s and 50s (no doubt the least keen of anyone on giving up a weekend to build an app). Experiments were then made compulsory across the bank, rather than left to some remote innovation lab. (Gupta had once worked for a firm that spent several billion US dollars on a separate research outfit and then shut it down with very little to show for it, and had no wish to sit through that again). Then, only once the habit had taken hold, did the big moves follow. In July 2016 Euromoney named DBS the world’s best digital bank, and in 2019 the world’s best bank, a first for an Asian lender. By then the people doing the shutting down and the rebuilding tended to be the same as those who had spotted the problem in the first place, which is a great deal easier than persuading them that there is a fire simply because the new CEO says so.

In practice, that probably means a first year that looks, to analysts (and perhaps even to boards expecting great changes), disappointingly uneventful. It consists of a lot of listening, a lot of time spent on the shop floor talking to staff and customers, and a very deliberate effort to push the job of spotting what is wrong (and the permission to say so out loud) down to the people who might actually be able to smell the smoke.

Reinvantage Insight

The byline Reinvantage Insight is used to denote articles to which several members of the Reinvantage insight and analysis team may have contributed.